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A central theme in Pavlov’s first public discussion of
conditioning, which we are commemorating here, was that
conditioning allows the organism to adapt to its world. In
speaking of the unconditioned reaction he said, “Observing
the normal activity of these glands, it is impossible not
to be struck with the high degree in which they are
adapted to their work. Give the animal some dry, hard
food, and there is a great flow of saliva, but with watery
food there is much less” (Pavlov, 1928, p. 48). He went
on to emphasize the same property of conditioned
reactions, “… these substances … act exactly the same
upon these glands … when they are a certain distance
from the dog. Dry food, even from a distance, produces
much saliva; moist food, only a little” (Pavlov, 1928, p.
49). Thus, for Pavlov, one important purpose of
conditioning was to allow the animal’s behavior to reflect
accurately the world in which it had to function.
For Pavlov, this reflection of the world occurred at the
level of behavior itself. Hence his emphasis on what we
would now call the issue of the similarity between the CR
and the UR. Certainly discussions of adaptation at this level
have been a continuing theme of students, especially in the
middle part of the last century. However, I think it is fair
to say that for many of us, conditioning represents adaptation
at a more cognitive level. For many contemporary students
of learning, conditioning provides a way in which the animal
adjusts its knowledge so as to reflect the state of the world.
Influenced not only by the physiology of Pavlov but also
by the associationism of British philosophers, many see
conditioning as a means by which organisms build up
knowledge of the structure of the world. Like Pavlov, they
see the organism as changing so as to reflect accurately the
world; but unlike Pavlov they have seen that reflection less
directly at the level of behavior and more at the level of
knowledge representation.
This article touches on three aspects of this contemporary
view of conditioning as generating an accurate knowledge
representation: how the animal constructs that knowledge
initially, how it modifies that knowledge when its experience
with the world changes, and how it can maintain and use
multiple knowledge representations as conditions demand.
This discussion will illustrate something of the current state
of work in conditioning, naturally enough using examples
from work done in my own lab.
Constructing Initial Representations
Let me begin with the building of initial knowledge
representations. Perhaps the key idea in our contemporary
idea of how conditioning develops is that of error-correction.
It is common to view the organism as comparing its current
knowledge of the world with the new experiences that it
has, evaluating the degree to which its knowledge is an
accurate reflection of that experience. To the degree that the
knowledge of the world and experience do not agree, the
organism detects an error. It then uses that error to correct
its knowledge. The idea is that the animal builds an accurate
understanding of the world by continually adjusting its
knowledge in the light of its current experience.
A primitive, but still serviceable, version of such error
correction was described by Rescorla and Wagner (1972) a
quarter of a century ago. Although oversimplified, and even
demonstrably incorrect in many ways, it has continued to
provide a rough description of conditioning and to serve as
the basis for a variety of more elaborate models. Figure 1
shows a version of this theory.
This theory follows Pavlov in attempting to characterize
knowledge representation in terms of the formation of
associations between a conditioned stimulus (CS) and an
unconditioned stimulus (US), when the two are paired. As
shown in the top equation in Figure 1, this model describes
the changes in the strength of those associations that result
AB --> US
∆VA = k (λ − VA )
A --> US
∆VA = k (λ − VAB )
∆VB = k (λ − VAB )
VAB = VA + VB
AB --> 0
∆VA = k (0 − VAB )
∆VB = k (0 − VAB )
VAB = VA + VB
Figure 1. Error-correction equations for three kinds of conditioning
trials, according to the Rescorla-Wagner model. In the first case,
stimulus A is presented alone and followed by the US. The
associative strength of A (VA) is compared to the asymptote that
the US will support (l). Some percentage (k) of their difference
governs changes in the associative strength of A (DVA). In the
second, case stimuli A and B are both followed by the US. In the
third case, the AB compound is nonreinforced.
from experiences such as the following of stimulus A by a
US. According to the theory, the change in the associative
strength of a signal A (VA) is characterized by DVA = k(l-
VA), where l is the asymptotic associative strength that the
US is capable of producing. That is, on each trial, the organism
calculates the discrepancy between its current associative
strength, VA, and the appropriate strength, l, and then adjusts
its current strength by some constant percentage of this
discrepancy, or error. As can readily be seen, when the
organism first experiences a US after a novel CS, the error
will be substantial, because there is no existing associative
strength; that is, initially VA will be zero. As a result, the trial
will produce a marked adjustment in VA in order to bring it
into line with l. Repeated experiences of this sort will result
in smaller and smaller error terms, with the result that the VA
will eventually become quite close to l. Moreover, VA will
approach l in a way that is characteristic of many conditioning
processes, by a negatively accelerated path. That is, with
experience, VA provides an increasingly accurate representation.
Many error-correction models also apply this mechanism
to situations that are somewhat more complicated, involving
two alternative signals of the US. The second set of
equations in Figure 1 displays the Rescorla-Wagner version
of this application. According to such models, the animal
adopts the same error detection and correction procedure
for multiple signals, resulting in equations of the form DVA
= k(l–VAB), and DVB = k(l–VAB ), where VAB = VA + VB.
That is, the animal is seen as evaluating the error between
the total strength of the AB stimulus (VAB) and l, allowing
each stimulus to use that joint error term as a basis for
correcting its strength. That correction will continue until
the two stimuli together yield an accurate representation, a
near–l total associative strength.
Error signal models of this general sort are widely
adopted not only within conditioning but more broadly in
neural network and connectionist models, as well as in
engineering applications. They provide a local learning rule
that turns out to do a surprisingly good job of generating
global representations of the world. 
One early success of such models was to provide an
account of some of the phenomena that Pavlov himself
reported. For instance, Pavlov noted that the amount of
conditioning that he observed to a stimulus, A, when it was
paired with a US, would be diminished if another stimulus,
B, were jointly presented with A. Pavlov called this
phenomenon “overshadowing.” It is as though the stimuli
compete with each other for developing associative strength.
Although there are multiple explanations for overshadowing,
error correction models give one natural account: If an
animal receives A+ trials, then the error must be corrected
entirely by changes in VA. However, if the animal receives
AB+ trials, then changes in both VA and VB contribute to
that correction. As a result, simple A+ trials will mean that
VA approaches l, whereas AB+ trials will result in VA
approaching a value less than l.
An extremely influential application of such models
came in the phenomenon of blocking, first observed by
Kamin (1968) but anticipated in the writings of Konorski
(1948). In a blocking experiment, AB+ trials are preceded
by separate A+ trials. Under these circumstances the
overshadowing of B by A can be enhanced substantially,
sometimes to the point where prior conditioning of A entirely
prevents any conditioning of B. Error correction models
naturally account for this finding because the prior
conditioning of A results in a VA that is close to l, yielding
only a small error term on the AB+ trials. Because the error
is small on these trials, B undergoes little associative change;
i.e., B is blocked despite its being followed by a US. 
The important finding of conditioned inhibition, first
reported by Pavlov, is viewed by error correction models
as highly related to blocking. Pavlov noted that if he
intermixed two kinds of conditioning trials, A followed by
the US and AB followed by no US, not only did A become
capable of evoking salivation, but B became capable of
inhibiting that salivation. Any B stimulus treated in this way
has two properties that led Pavlov to claim it was inhibitory:
B can diminish the salivary response that other excitatory
stimuli otherwise control, and B is difficult to convert into
an exciter if it is then used to signal the US.
The third set of equations in Figure 1 shows the account
that error correction models give of this learning. The separate
A+ trials yield a VA that is close to the l appropriate to its
reinforcement. However, on the AB– trials no reinforcement
is given, with the result that the asymptote appropriate to
such trials is quite low, perhaps zero. That means that once
A has become conditioned, the error term appropriate on the
AB– trials is (0-VAB) or –l. That is to say that the AB– trials
should produce negative change in both VA and VB. Since
this is B’s only learning experience, it develops an associative
strength that is below zero, negative. Indeed, one can show
that asymptotically VB would approach –l, whereas VA would
approach +l. The B stimulus with negative associative strength
would naturally subtract from those with positive strength
and also be hard to train to have its own positive strength.
Error correction models explain these Pavlovian
phenomena because they see associative change as governed
not simply by the occurrence of US but rather by the
discrepancy between the US that occurs and that which was
expected on the basis of the associative strength of the
antecedent stimuli. That is, error correction models are
sensitive not to the absolute US but to the relation between
that US and the associative strength of antecedent stimuli.
That same feature has allowed error-correction models to
predict new and surprising phenomena that had not been
observed by Pavlov. To emphasize the power of such models
to make novel predictions, I want to describe two such
phenomena whose discovery was foretold by error correction
models: overexpectation and superconditioning. 
First, overexpectation, a case in which error correction
models predict that Pavlovian pairing of a CS with a US
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will reduce, rather than augment, associative strength. An
experiment conducted in my laboratory by Lattal and
Nakajima (1998) provides a nice illustration. They used a
popular contemporary Pavlovian preparation: the magazine
approach. In this preparation, diffuse auditory and visual
stimuli signal the availability of food in a particular location,
the magazine. Rats given this Pavlovian treatment approach
and place their heads in the magazine in anticipation of the
food, something that can be measured by the interruption
of a photocell. The top portion of Figure 2 shows the design
of one of their experiments. Initially they conducted
conditioning with a light, L, and two auditory stimuli, A
and B. Then they presented L in compound with one of the
auditory stimuli, B, and followed that compound by the
same pellet that had followed each stimulus individually;
the A was a nonpresented control. Finally, they tested
responding to both A and B. Consider the expectations of
such a manipulation from the point of view of an error
correction model. The original training should result in both
B and L having associative strengths near l. When they are
presented in compound, however, their total associative
strength (VLB) should greatly exceed l; indeed, the
compound should have a value of 2l. However, the error
term applicable to a reinforced LB trial is (l-VLB). Since
VLB (= 2l) is initially greater than l, the expectation of such
models is that reinforcing the compound should not only
fail to increase the strength of the B and L elements, it
should actually diminish them. In effect, the reinforcer is
overexpected, even though physically it is still highly potent.
The bottom half of Figure 2 shows the results of their
experiment. To the left are the final levels of responding
during a pre-CS period and during the two auditory stimuli,
A and B. Both stimuli augmented responding relative to the
pre-CS rate, and to about the same extent. To the right are
the results of presenting A and B again after the imposition
of the LB+ trials. It is clear that although the control A
continued to show substantial responding, the level of
responding to the treated B was greatly diminished. That
is, overexpectation was observed as predicted; reinforcing
the B stimulus in the presence of another exciter reversed
the normal effects of reinforcement. This result was
confirmed in a variety of related experiments. It is a
surprising, and relatively unique, prediction from error
correction models. It highlights the fact that the impact of
a US depends not on its absolute physical power, but rather
on the error term it generates. That is, error correction allows
the animal to accurately adjust its knowledge to the current
conditions of the world.
The example of overexpectation shows how one can
exploit an error correction mechanism to arrange for the
reinforcing power of a US to be so diminished as to lead
to associative decrements. The second example,
superconditioning, is the converse, in which one uses an
error correction mechanism to so enhance the reinforcing
power of a US that it produces an extra measure of
conditioning. A recent experiment in our laboratory provides
an especially striking example (Rescorla, 2003). This
experiment used an autoshaping procedure in pigeons. In
this procedure localized visual stimuli are used to signal
grain reinforcement; as conditioning proceeds, the pigeon
comes to direct pecking at the visual stimulus. The design
of this particular experiment is shown at the top of Figure
3. The birds first received a conditioning procedure of the
form: A++, B++, AN–, BN–, in which A and B were visual
stimuli, N was a diffuse auditory stimulus, and ++ indicates
the immediate presentation of 5-sec of grain. As noted above,
such a procedure will result in A and B becoming strong
exciters and N becoming an inhibitor. Next, the animals
were given NA and B trials, both followed by a reinforcer
(+) that was weaker than the immediate grain originally
used with A and B. That weaker reinforcer consisted of the
delayed presentation of the 5-sec of grain; the interval
between the stimuli and grain was filled by another visual
stimulus. This delayed gap-filling procedure has been
documented to yield stable, but reduced, associative strength,
compared with the use of immediate grain. 
The question of interest was what impact this reduced
reinforcer would have on the associative strengths of A and
B. The predictions of an error correction model are clear:
B should lose strength because it is being followed by a
diminished reinforcer. The asymptote that + can support is
less than that which ++ can support, so the error term for
Figure 2. Design and results of an overexpectation experiment.
Initially, three stimuli, L, A, and B, are each followed by a
reinforcer (+). Then the LB compound is followed by the same
reinforcer and the individual A and B stimuli are tested (after
Lattal & Nakajima, 1998).
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B is negative. However, A should gain strength from that
same reinforcer because A is reinforced in the presence of
the inhibitory N. Because the NA compound initially
commands little strength it is quite discrepant from the
asymptote that even the weaker reinforcer should produce.
As a result, despite the fact that A is followed by a weaker
reinforcer than it had received in the past, it should undergo
increases in conditioning beyond its original strength.
The bottom half of Figure 3 shows the results of this
experiment. The left-hand side shows the changes over the
course of the treatment in which B and NA are both followed
by the weaker reinforcer. It is clear that responding to B
decreased, whereas that to NA increased, as expected. To
the right are the results of the test in which A and B were
both tested. Those results show that the reinforcement of A
in the context of N had indeed augmented the power of the
reinforcer, so that responding was greater to A than to B.
That is, superconditioning had occurred. More generally,
the same reinforcer could produce either decreases or
increases in associative strength, depending on the error
term that it generates.
These examples are intended to illustrate the considerable
power of an error correction model. It has the ability to
explain old phenomena, generate new phenomena, and
provide an overall context in which to view many
conditioning results. It is this that has made it a powerful
tool as the major learning mechanism used in neural network
models. It implements the motivation behind Pavlov’s ideas
by providing a way to allow the animal to adjust accurately
to the world.
However, one should not think that the analysis of error
correction models is in any sense complete. Indeed, some
recent experiments in our laboratory have uncovered some
potentially quite damaging flaws with one of the basic
assumptions of error correction models (e.g., Rescorla, 2000).
Such models have the strong implication that when A and
B are reinforced together in compound, they are subjected
to exactly the same error; the result is that they should show
exactly the same associative change. Indeed, it is that feature
of error correction mechanisms that makes neural network
models so powerful. However, some recent data suggest
that under some circumstances this implication may not be
correct (e.g. Rescorla, 2000). It remains to be seen whether
or not this will prove disastrous for such models.
It is important to realize that error correction models like
this are not simply convenient frameworks within which to
think about conditioning at the behavioral level. Of course,
Pavlov saw the promise of conditioning as a way to
investigate the brain. Contemporary error correction models
have begun to pay off on that promise by guiding
neurobiological research. For instance, recent work by
Thompson and his collaborators (e.g., Kim, Krupa, &
Thompson, 1998) has provided a detailed understanding of
the neural circuitry responsible for eyelid conditioning in the
rabbit. An essential part of that understanding has been the
identification of a neural basis for the computation of the
error term on which behavioral models depend. Thompson’s
laboratory has found evidence, for instance, of an inhibitory
feedback loop acting on the pathway along which US
information travels, a loop that allows a CS that has a strong
excitatory association to diminish the impact of that US. In
effect, as anticipated by behavioral models, an expected US
has a diminished impact. Similarly, a great deal of evidence
points to the involvement of dopamine neurons in the
reinforcement process. Recent evidence reported by Schultz
and his collaborators (e.g., Schultz, 1998) indicates that the
output of these neurons is importantly governed by the kind
of discrepancy that error term models identify. So, we are
beginning to make serious progress in understanding the
neural basis of such error correction mechanisms.
Changing Representations
Although understanding the initial development of
knowledge about the world is important, it could be argued
that it is even more important to understand how organisms
adjust that knowledge when the world changes. In his first
lecture on conditioning, Pavlov reported the earliest and
most well studied of these adjustments to changed conditions,
experimental extinction. Just as the following of a CS by a
Figure 3. Design and results of a superconditioning experiment.
Initially A and B are followed by immediate grain (++) when
presented alone, but not when presented in compound with a noise
(N). Then NA and B are both followed by delayed grain (+) and
the individual A and B stimuli are tested (after Rescorla, 2003).
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US leads to one adjustment, the development of responding,
so subsequently presenting the CS alone leads to another
adjustment, the loss of responding. From the outset, Pavlov
identified the importance of extinction and was fascinated
by it. He describes (Pavlov, 1928, p 53) that “If you only
show the dog food, and repeat this several times, at each
repetition you get a weaker result, and finally no reaction
whatever.” Indeed, he used this observation as one of his
primary arguments that the reaction to the sight of food was
a conditioned, rather than an unconditioned, response. 
In the continuation of that same section, Pavlov identified
the first piece of evidence that led him to the important
conclusion that extinction did not involve the erasure of
original learning. He went on to say, “… if meat powder,
having been repeatedly brought before the dog, fails to
produce a flow of saliva, we may again make it active by
giving it to the dog to eat [after showing it].” Pavlov
suggested that reestablishment of the response was
exceedingly rapid, implying preservation of some of the
original learning. As Pavlov pursued the study of
conditioning he was to come to describe several other
phenomena that formed the principle factual basis on which
he drew this conclusion: spontaneous recovery and
disinhibition. These led him to suggest that the changed
conditions that produced extinction did so not by changing
the original knowledge but rather by superimposing some
alternative knowledge. For Pavlov, conditioned inhibition
provided this alternative knowledge. 
Contemporary studies of extinction have stayed very
much within the framework outlined by Pavlov, but have
expanded it in two ways: (a) They have elaborated on the
phenomena that support the conclusion that extinction does
not remove original knowledge, and (b) They have provided
new techniques that encourage the stronger conclusion of
Pavlov that extinction left that original knowledge fully
intact. Each point merits further comment.
Several techniques have been found, in addition to
spontaneous recovery and disinhibition, which will restore
responding to an extinguished stimulus, even without
restoring the relation of the stimulus to the US. One of these
is simple reexposure to the US itself in the absence of the
CS. This US exposure will reinstate responding to the CS,
often to a substantial degree (e.g., Bouton, 1984; Delamater,
1997; Rescorla & Heth, 1972). Actually, Pavlov himself
reported this phenomenon but he made little of it. Another
technique that restores responding involves moving the CS
to a new context, different from that in which original
training or extinction had taken place. Bouton (e.g., 1991)
has reported many experiments in which such a procedure
restores responding to the CS. Finally, one can reveal the
presence of the original knowledge by testing the
extinguished CS not for responding to itself, but for its
ability to add to the responding of a different,
nonextinguished, stimulus. Although Reberg (1972) reported
this result many years ago, it has remained under-appreciated. 
A recent example from our lab illustrates Reberg’s
finding. This experiment used the magazine approach in
rats, giving initial conditioning of one stimulus, B and
presenting another, C, without reinforcement. Then both B
and C were presented repeatedly without reinforcement. As
is clear in Figure 4, initially B showed substantial
responding, but this declined over the course of 28 days of
extinction. Indeed, after about the 10th day of 8
nonreinforced trials per day there was no difference in
responding to B and C. At this point, spontaneous recovery
from day to day had also disappeared. However, despite the
similarity of performance to B and C, it is relatively easy
to show that B has not lost its original conditioning. After
the 28 days of extinction, B and C were both tested in
compound with another stimulus, A, which had been
conditioned to a moderate level. Figure 5 shows the results
of that test. The moderately-trained A stimulus augmented
responding relative to the pre-stimulus rate. However, when
B was added to A, there was a great deal more responding;
despite producing little response of its own, B greatly
augmented the response to A. Moreover, this augmentation
was indeed attributable to B’s history of training and
extinction, because the comparison stimulus, C, lacking any
conditioning history, failed to have this effect. A summation
test of this sort is apparently a powerful technique for
revealing that even after extended extinction something of
the original learning remains.
However, Pavlov wanted to draw a conclusion stronger
than such experiments permit. These procedures can only
provide evidence that extinction left something of the original
training intact. Pavlov, and others, have wished to conclude
that extinction has left everything intact. It turns out that
several more contemporary techniques have been developed
that do provide relevant evidence. Typical results from one
such technique are shown in Figure 6.
Figure 4. Extended extinction of a previously-reinforced (+) B
stimulus, compared with presentation of a never-reinforced C
stimulus.
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That figure shows the results of a magazine approach
experiment (Rescorla, 1996) in which rats had been exposed
to 4 stimuli, two visual and two auditory. One stimulus
within each modality had been paired with pellets and one
with liquid sucrose. Subsequently, the animals were subjected
to a devaluation procedure in which one of those outcomes
was itself paired with LiCl, a substance that makes the
animal ill. Previous experiments had shown that this
treatment would dramatically reduce the value of the
outcome so paired. More importantly, we knew it would
reduce responding to any stimulus paired with that outcome.
This is evidence for the specificity of the CS-US information
in original learning. The data on the left-hand side of Figure
6 show an example of the impact of this devaluation. There
is much less responding to the stimulus whose outcome had
been devalued (DEV). But it is the data on the right-hand
side that are of interest here. These come from a pair of
stimuli that had also been paired with the different outcomes
but were then subjected to extensive extinction before the
devaluation. The point to notice is that the stimuli given
extinction were as sensitive to the devaluation procedure as
those not extinguished. This suggests that the information
from acquisition that allowed the differential effect of
devaluation remained fully intact despite extinction. Thus,
modern experiments have sharpened Pavlov’s argument that
extinction leaves original training intact. That is, they support
his view of what extinction is not: the removal of original
learning.
Where contemporary work has been less successful is
in identifying what extinction is. Pavlov expressed his own
puzzlement in this original talk, “Among the above-
mentioned facts there are some which at present are with
difficulty explained from the physiological point of view.
For example, why does a conditioned reflex, if repeated,
lose its activity?” The best he could muster was “Probably
we have to deal here with quite peculiar conditions for the
excitation which travels along the temporary centripetal
paths” (Pavlov, 1928, p. 57). Although some suggestions
have been made (e.g., Rescorla, 2001), we are still a long
way from a full understanding of extinction.
Use of Multiple Representations
If one supposes that changed conditions result both in
the preservation of original knowledge and in the acquisition
of new knowledge reflecting the new conditions, then an
important question naturally arises: How do these two pieces
of knowledge interact? This leads to the third point about
adaptation to the environment. Contemporary work has found
evidence that when two kinds of knowledge about the same
CS exist side by side, other stimuli often play the role of
selecting among them to control actual performance. Thus,
if a CS is paired with a US in some circumstances but not
in others, those circumstances can control the degree to
which the CS evokes a CR. That is, other stimuli can gain
conditional control over which association is expressed.
Figure 5. Summation testing of responding to the B and C stimuli
whose extinction was shown in Figure 4. Stimulus A received
moderate training prior to testing of A alone and in compound
with B and C. Responding is also shown in the period just prior
to stimulus presentation (Pre).
Figure 6. Responding to 4 stimuli, all of which had been given
Pavlovian conditioning. Prior to the test, the outcome used with
two of the stimuli had been devalued (DEV) by pairing with LiCl.
Two of the stimuli had been extinguished prior to this devaluation
(after Rescorla, 1966).
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An example of this kind of control comes in
contemporary studies of so-called occasion setting — in
which one stimulus sets the occasion on which another will
signal the US. Figure 7 shows two examples of such
occasion setting in an autoshaping experiment conducted in
my laboratory. In that experiment, pigeons received the
illumination of two key lights, one red and the other green
(A and B). Both key lights were sometimes reinforced with
food and sometimes not followed by food, on a random half
of their presentations. However, for each stimulus a diffuse
white noise or houselight (X and Y) signaled when it would
be followed by food. Key light A was reinforced except
when accompanied by the diffuse stimulus, X. Key light B
was nonreinforced except when accompanied by the diffuse
stimulus, Y. Both X and Y came to have conditional control
over responding to A and B. The right panel shows that the
B-, YB+ positive occasion setting procedure resulted in little
responding to B when presented alone but substantial
pecking at B when it was accompanied by Y. The left panel
shows the opposite pattern for X and A when an A+, XA-
negative occasion setting procedure was used: Stimulus A
controlled substantial responding except when accompanied
by X. In each case, A and B have been associated with both
reinforcement and nonreinforcement, and in each case X
and Y signal whether A or B will be reinforced. 
This conditional signaling power of X and Y turns out
not to be confined to the A and B stimuli. After this training,
another key light, C, received both training and then partial
extinction so as to endow it with both kinds of association.
The question was whether X and Y would select from these
two associations of C. Figure 8 shows responding to that
trained and extinguished stimulus under four different
conditions: When it was presented alone, when it was
accompanied by the negative occasion setting X, when it
was accompanied by the positive occasion setting Y, and
when it was accompanied by both X and Y. It is clear that
the yellow stimulus alone evoked a moderate level of
performance, as expected because of its history of training
and partial extinction. But X and Y modulated responding
to it in different directions, presumably because they selected
either the reinforcement or nonreinforcement association for
expression. Of equal interest, when X and Y were both
present, they tended to cancel each other out, again yielding
an intermediate level of responding.
Experiments such as these suggest that stimuli signal
not simply other events but relations among other events.
The animal can maintain multiple associations between a
CS and US and use other stimuli as modulators that signal
when to use each of those associations. This is an exciting
new area of research that is receiving a great deal of
Figure 7. Two examples of occasion setting from an autoshaping situation. In negative occasion setting, key light A was followed by
grain (+) except when accompanied by diffuse stimulus X. In positive occasion setting, key light B was nonreinforced except when
accompanied by diffuse stimulus Y.
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empirical and theoretical attention (see Schmajuk & Holland,
1998). It has implications not only for simple conditioning
but for instrumental training, extinction, and indeed for
associative theory in general. It illustrates a further way in
which Pavlov’s notion, that the role of conditioning is to
help the animal adjust properly to the conditions of the
world, is being played out in contemporary thinking.
Error correction at the level of knowledge
As noted earlier, Pavlov saw conditioning as allowing
the animal to adjust to the world at the behavioral level. He
illustrated this with the fact that the CS comes to evoke an
anticipatory salivary response that is quite like that which
the US will evoke when it is presented. But contemporary
thinkers view conditioning as allowing the animal to match
not its overt behavior but rather its internal knowledge to
the world. One reason for this difference is that contemporary
theorists sharply distinguish between learning and
performance, frequently emphasizing that organisms may
have a rich knowledge of the world that is quite imperfectly
reflected in any particular behavioral measure. 
There are many examples in which one is inclined to
see conditioning as endowing the animal with accurate
knowledge that does not immediately exhibit itself in its
behavior. All of those cases encourage the contemporary
view that the animal is best viewed as adjusting its
knowledge, not just its behavior. Figure 9 shows one such
example from an experiment conducted in my lab some
years ago. In this experiment pigeon subjects were given
Pavlovian pairings of two different CSs with the same grain
US. One of these CSs was a localized visual stimulus, an
orange disk; the other was a diffuse auditory stimulus, an
1800 Hz tone. As a result of these pairings, the orange key
light came to evoke directed pecking, a response quite like
that evoked by the grain US. However, the tone showed no
evidence of producing directed pecking, even though it
received the same number of pairings with the US. The left-
hand side of the figure shows the stark contrast in
performance to these two stimuli. Here is plotted the
percentage of trials on which each stimulus evoked pecking.
Of course, an obvious possibility is that the animal learned
about the key light but not about the tone, with its
responding showing this learning at the behavioral level.
But it turns out that one can easily demonstrate that the
animal has learned about the tone-grain pairings as well,
despite the fact that this does not show in its pecking
behavior. This can be shown by taking some measure of the
animal’s knowledge other than the ability of the tone to
evoke UR-like behavior. For instance, one can use both the
orange key light and the tone as reinforcers for other key
lights in the manner of a second-order conditioning design.
As Pavlov showed, a stimulus that has developed an
Figure 8. Transfer test of the X and Y stimuli whose training is
shown in Figure 7. Stimulus C had received initial training and
incomplete extinction. It was then tested alone, in combination
with X and Y, and in combination with X and Y together.
Figure 9. The results of pairing a visual (V) and an auditory (A)
stimulus with grain in pigeon subjects. Despite substantial
differences in their likelihood of evoking directed pecking, the
two stimuli were quite similar in their ability to second-order
condition two other key light stimuli (X and Y).
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association with a US will not only evoke responses, it will
also become capable of serving in lieu of the US for
purposes of training other CSs. Indeed, we have frequently
found the ability of stimulus A to condition stimulus B to
be the best index of A’s own association with the US. The
right-hand side of Figure 9 shows the results of a second-
order conditioning test in which the tone and light were
each used as a reinforcer for other key lights. That figure
shows that both of these stimuli were fully capable of
establishing second-order conditioning. 
What these data suggest is that the conditioning procedure
has allowed the animal to build an accurate representation
of the relation to grain of both the tone and the orange key
light, but that the representations can play out in behavior
quite differently. The visual stimulus showed the knowledge
in pecking and the auditory stimulus did not. Indeed, one of
the major advances that has occurred in thinking about
conditioning is the realization that the way in which
knowledge is exhibited is determined not only by the US,
as Pavlov readily saw, but also by the CS (e.g., Holland,
1977). As illustrated here, different CSs, paired with the same
US, come to control quite different learned responses. Yet
both show their knowledge in the ability to produce second-
order conditioning. Clearly, any one behavioral measure can
give a highly misleading picture of the product of
conditioning. It is data like these that have led many to
emphasize conditioning as a means of the animal’s adjusting
its knowledge, rather than its behavior. This realization greatly
expands the importance of Pavlov’s discovery and brings it
into more complete contact with the rest of psychology.
Conclusion
So, how would Pavlov feel about what has happened in
the 100 years since his first announcement of conditioning?
From his point of view, the good news is that his ideas have
had a tremendous impact on psychology, arguably a greater
impact than those of any other scientist. Conditioning has
come to be seen as the basic learning process underlying a
vast array of phenomena. Most organisms capable of
benefiting from experience have proven to use conditioning
as a major means by which they do so. Moreover,
conditioning applies to a wide range of learning situations,
from simple associative ones, to perceptual situations, to
judgments of causality. Indeed, we have realized one of
Pavlov’s own claims—to have placed associationism on a
firm empirical footing. The ideas that blossomed in the area
of conditioning have proven central to the broad range of
network learning models that have been successfully applied
to many complex processes. They have proven basic to
many applied clinical phenomena, something that Pavlov
himself foresaw.
But from Pavlov’s point of view the bad news is that
this tremendous impact has been principally among
psychologists. Moreover, much of the impact has been
because psychologists have used conditioning in a more
abstract, conceptual way, rather than as a direct influence
on behavior. However, even the bad news has a silver lining.
In recent years psychologists have brought conditioning
back to physiologists to help neuroscientists guide the study
of learning at the neural level. 
Clearly, Pavlov would only partly recognize the child
to whom he gave birth. Like many parents he would surely
have wished that the child had matured somewhat differently.
But I am confident that he would also be proud of the
independent and highly influential adult that we see in
conditioning today.
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